Vincent Anak Marcos v Public Prosecutor

Appellant(s): Vincent Anak Marcos

Respondent(s):

• Pendakwa Raya
• [Pendakwa Raya]

• YA Dato' Lee Swee Seng
• YA Datuk Supang Lian
• YA Dato' Gunalan A/L Muniandy

• The appellant was charged with the murder of his two-month-old son under section 302 of the Penal Code, following the child's death from severe head injuries.
• The prosecution's case relied primarily on the eyewitness testimony of the deceased's mother, who recounted the appellant violently slamming the infant onto a sofa during a heated quarrel.
• The appellant's behaviour had become erratic, marked by accusations of infidelity against the mother and suspicions that the deceased was not his biological child.

• Whether the trial judge erred in finding that the appellant caused the deceased's death, particularly in light of the pathologist's opinion regarding the nature of the blunt force trauma.
• Whether the trial judge correctly found that the element of 'intention to kill' under Section 300(a) of the Penal Code was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
• Whether the trial judge failed to adequately consider the defence's arguments, including the mother's alleged inconsistent statements and the possibility of another person inflicting the fatal injuries.

• The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the appeal, affirming the appellant's conviction and death sentence, finding no appealable error by the trial judge.
• The Court held that the pathologist's opinion on the unlikelihood of the sofa cushion causing severe injuries was inadmissible and irrelevant, as it concerned matters within common experience and usurped the trial judge's function.
• The Court found that the trial judge correctly inferred the appellant's intention to cause death from his explicit threats and violent act, supported by the mother's credible eyewitness account, corroborating neighbour testimony, and the appellant's diagnosed paranoid personality disorder.
• The Court rejected the defence's attempts to discredit the mother or invoke the "two persons present" principle, deeming the mother's initial inconsistencies reasonable given her fear, and the appellant's defence a bare denial.