Professor Dato’ Dr. Mohd Fauzi bin Ramlan v Universiti Putra Malaysia & Ors

Appellant(s): Professor Dato' Dr. Mohd Fauzi Bin Ramlan

Respondent(s):

• Universiti Putra Malaysia (UPM)
• Jawatankuasa Rayuan Tatatertib, Universiti Putra Malaysia
• Menteri Pendidikan Malaysia

• YA Datuk S. Nantha Balan A/L E.S. Moorthy
• YA Dato' Mohd Nazlan Bin Mohd Ghazali
• Dato' Dr. Choo Kah Sing

• The appellant, a former Vice-Chancellor, faced disciplinary proceedings for signing two agreements on behalf of the first respondent without prior Board approval, leading to a charge of misconduct (insubordination).
• The Disciplinary Committee (DC) found the appellant guilty and imposed a reduction in rank; this decision was subsequently upheld by the Disciplinary Appeal Committee (DAC).
• The appellant's application for Judicial Review to quash the DAC's decision was dismissed by the High Court, leading to the present appeal.

• Whether any alleged procedural deficiencies at the initial disciplinary inquiry stage could be retrospectively cured by a subsequent appellate hearing, as per *Calvin v Carr*.
• Whether the principle from *University of Ceylon v Fernando* (allowing disciplinary authority to interview witnesses without the accused's presence or knowledge of testimony) is compatible with *B Surinder Singh Kanda v The Government of The Federation of Malaya* (right to know and meet the case, undisclosed evidence vitiates proceedings).
• Whether the appellant's failure to request to be present or cross-examine witnesses amounted to a waiver of his right to procedural fairness in administrative disciplinary proceedings.

• The Court of Appeal held that the DAC's proceedings were fundamentally flawed because witnesses were heard in the appellant's absence, denying him the opportunity to clarify, rebut, or contradict their evidence.
• The Court rejected the *Fernando* principle as anomalous and incompatible with the robust *audi alteram partem* rule established in *Kanda*, which is enshrined in the Federal Constitution's guarantees of procedural fairness (Articles 5(1), 8(1), 135(2)).
• The Court further ruled that waiver does not apply to fundamental procedural breaches of natural justice, and thus the DAC's unfair conduct meant that any earlier defects in the disciplinary process were not cured. The appeal was allowed, the DAC's decision quashed, and the appellant reinstated to his original rank with benefits.