Phillvin Guachin v Public Prosecutor

Appellant(s): Phillvin Guachin

Respondent(s): Pendakwa Raya

• YA Datuk Noorin binti Badaruddin
• YA Datuk Mohd Radzi Bin Abdul Hamid
• YA Datuk Meor Hashimi bin Abdul Hamid

• Customs officers seized a lorry and cigarettes on 18 January 2025 and issued a Notice of Seizure under s 128 of the Customs Act 1967, but the appellant was only charged under s 135(1)(e) of the Act 39 days later.
• The appellant applied to the High Court to quash the charge, arguing the prosecution was invalid as it was instituted beyond the 30-day period referred to in s 128 of the Act.
• The High Court dismissed the application, holding that s 128 does not prescribe a limitation period for criminal prosecution and merely governs the forfeiture status of seized goods, prompting this appeal.

• Whether the 30-day period stipulated in s 128 of the Customs Act 1967 constitutes a limitation period for commencing criminal prosecution, such that a prosecution instituted thereafter is void or invalid.
• Whether the Court of Appeal's earlier decision in AGM Duty Free (Tengah) Sdn Bhd v Mohamad Hafiz Ishak & Ors bound the High Court, under the doctrine of stare decisis, to hold that prosecution must commence within 30 days of seizure.
• Whether the statutory forfeiture regime concerning seized goods under s 128 is distinct from, and has no bearing on, the validity of a criminal prosecution against an individual under s 135.

• The Court held that s 128 only regulates the treatment, claim, release and forfeiture of seized goods, and contains no express language imposing a time limit on institution of criminal prosecution or rendering a late charge void or a nullity.
• The Court found that the passage in AGM Duty Free relied upon by the appellant must be read in the context of forfeiture proceedings and could not be elevated into a general limitation period for criminal prosecutions, and thus the High Court did not breach stare decisis.
• The Court affirmed that forfeiture proceedings concerning property and criminal prosecution against an individual are separate and distinct processes, that the Public Prosecutor's constitutional discretion under Article 145(3) to prosecute is unaffected absent express statutory restriction, and dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's refusal to quash the charge.