Muralikrishna a/l Nokiah & Ors v Public Prosecutor

Appellant(s): Muralikrishna A/L Nokiah

Respondent(s):

• Pendakwa Raya
• [Timbalan Pendakwa Raya (TPR), Jabatan Peguam Negara]

• YA Dato' Paduka Azman Bin Abdullah
• YA Datuk Mohamed Zaini Bin Mazlan
• YA Datuk Noorin binti Badaruddin

• The first appellant negotiated a sale of methamphetamine with an undercover agent provocateur, leading to a rendezvous where a package was delivered via a vehicle driven by the second appellant and carrying the third appellant.
• The High Court convicted all three appellants of drug trafficking under Section 39B(1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, finding that they acted with common intention to sell the prohibited substance.
• The appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal, with the first appellant challenging the evaluation of his "drug mule" defence and the others contesting the findings on knowledge and common intention.

• Whether a conviction for trafficking by way of "selling" under Section 2 of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 requires the Prosecution to separately prove possession or invoke statutory presumptions.
• Whether the failure to call a material witness (an intermediary) and the omission of forensic phone analysis created a material lacuna warranting an adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950.
• Whether the mere act of transporting a package and being present at the scene, absent proof of knowledge of the contents, is sufficient to establish liability for common intention under Section 34 of the Penal Code.

• The Court affirmed the first appellant’s conviction, ruling that trafficking by sale is complete upon delivery following a concluded negotiation, but substituted the death penalty with life imprisonment and twelve strokes of the cane.
• The Court acquitted the second and third appellants, holding that the Prosecution failed to prove they shared a common intention or had knowledge of the drugs, citing material contradictions in witness testimony and significant investigative gaps.
• The Court emphasized that while knowledge may be inferred from surrounding circumstances, suspicion—regardless of how grave—cannot substitute for proof beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly when the Prosecution fails to call a witness central to the narrative.