Irewan Effandy bin Ismail v Pendakwa Raya

Appellant(s): Irewan Effandy Bin Ismail

Respondent(s):

• Pendakwa Raya
• [Pendakwa Raya]

• YA Dato' Paduka Azman Bin Abdullah
• YA Datuk Hayatul Akmal binti Abdul Aziz
• YA Dato' Amarjeet Singh a/l Serjit Singh

• The appellant was charged with trafficking 670.3 grams of methamphetamine under Section 39B(1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, convicted by the High Court, and sentenced to life imprisonment and 15 strokes of the cane.
• The drugs were discovered in a plastic bag on the driver's floorboard of a Perodua Alza driven by the appellant, who was accompanied by a female passenger (SP2).
• SP2, initially a co-accused but later discharged, testified for the prosecution that the appellant collected the bag from another vehicle and placed it in the Alza, while the appellant claimed he was merely collecting a package for his employer without knowledge of its contents.

• Whether the High Court erred in finding the co-accused turned prosecution witness (SP2) to be credible, particularly given her "equal access" to the drugs and the alleged need for corroboration.
• Whether the prosecution's failure to call the registered owner of the vehicle where the drugs were found created a material gap in the prosecution's case.
• Whether the prosecution's failure to call "Ah Beng," the alleged employer who instructed the appellant, warranted an adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950.

• The Court affirmed the High Court's finding that SP2 was a credible eyewitness, whose testimony regarding the appellant's custody and control of the drugs was materially corroborated by other prosecution witnesses (SP6 and SP7).
• The Court held that the prosecution's failure to call the untraceable registered owner of the vehicle did not create a material gap, as the charge concerned possession and trafficking, not ownership, and other evidence sufficiently established the appellant's exclusive access to the vehicle.
• The Court found no adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 for the prosecution's failure to call "Ah Beng," as he was not deemed a material witness to the core elements of the offense (custody, control, and knowledge), and the appellant's defence regarding him was not credible.