Icon City Development Sdn. Bhd. v Lee Kean Hwa & Ors

Appellant(s): Icon City Development Sdn Bhd

Respondent(s):

• Lim Cheng Nguan
• Ong Sze Lin
• Tan Pei Wan
• Lim Wen Hwee
• Lee Wai Leong
• Lau Kok Kee
• Ho Choon Foong
• Marilyn Lau Mei Kwan
• Tan Lye Seng
• Beh Tien Fong
• Ng Yaw Long
• Beh Tien Ling
• Chou Choon Guan
• Kong Peoy Siew
• Joshua Chou Kean Ming
• Ong Mei Huey
• Jakais Kaur a.p Sucha Singh
• Ishvinder kaur a/p Paramjit Singh

• YA Datuk See Mee Chun
• YA Datuk Wong Kian Kheong
• YA Datuk Azhahari Kamal bin Ramli

• The appellant, a property developer, sold "Small Office Versatile Office" (SOVO) units to the respondents under standard Sale and Purchase Agreements (SPAs) for a mixed development project.
• The SPAs stipulated a 42-month period for the delivery of vacant possession, with liquidated damages (LD) payable for any delay by the developer.
• The core dispute across multiple suits filed by the purchasers (respondents) was the commencement date of this 42-month period: whether it began from the local authority's (LA) first approval of the building plans or the LA's last approval for amendments to the plans.

• The primary legal issue was the interpretation of the SPA provisions to determine the precise commencement date of the 42-month period for delivery of vacant possession.
• For the first appeal, a key issue was whether the respondents' new High Court suit was barred by the doctrine of res judicata, given an earlier Court of Appeal decision that set aside a lower court's judgment on jurisdictional grounds.
• Another issue in the first appeal was whether the appellant had raised any triable issues to successfully resist the respondents' application for summary judgment.

• The Court dismissed all appeals, affirming the lower Courts' decisions that the 42-month period for delivery of vacant possession commenced from the LA's first approval of the building plans.
• The Court applied a "business common sense interpretation" and the "contra proferentem" rule, concluding that the SPA's terms, particularly Clauses 1.1, 13.1.1, 35A.1, and Section 10 of Schedule A, unambiguously pointed to the first approval date.
• The Court held that the doctrine of res judicata did not apply to the first appeal because the earlier Court of Appeal decision was based on the Magistrate's Court's lack of jurisdiction, rendering its previous judgment a nullity and not a decision on the merits.